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COMMENT

STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL MODELS FOR
THE PROPOSED NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION

ON THE ENVIRONMENT
Lloyd 3. Spivak"

INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 1992,1 the United States, Canada, and Mexico completed negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)." Former President Bush labeled the agreement historic3 and
stated that it would create jobs and generate economic growth in all

three countries. He also stated that it contained "stringent provisions to
benefit the environment."" The President's comment, along with statements made by other administration officials,S was clearly in response to
* .D.Candidate, May 1994. Washington College of Law,

The American University.

Approximately one month prior to publication (during the week of August 16, 1993), the
governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico anounced completion of the parallel agreement that will establish the NACE. Consequently, a few elements in this
Comment are already outdated. In particular, where this Comment addresses the United
States Governmentrs proposal for the NACE, the reader should mentally insert the word

"origmal."

The intent of this Comment was to provoke debate, not to provide a detailed blueprint
for the structure and functions of the proposed NACE Some of the recommendations
herein may be superfluous under the new accord, but most of the proposals should remain
useful while Congress debates NAFIA. Even after the NACE is established and operating,
the advice given here will remain cogent.
1. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREENENT, DESCRIPIION OF THE PROPOSED NORTH A.iERICAN FREE TRADE AGRJMENT, Aug. 12, 1992 [hereinafter HIGHUGHTS].
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Draft, Sept. 6, 1992 [hereinafter
NAFrA], available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra File.
3. OFFCE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WITE HousE, Statement by the
President, Aug. 12, 1992, reproduced in 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1450 (Aug. 12,
1992).
4. ld
5. See USTR Hills Says There PWill Be No 'Downward Harmonization' Under
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previous criticism of the environmental provisions of the agreement.
Congress had expressed its concerns in a resolution passed on August 6,
1992.6 Environmental organizations criticized NAFTA long before the
negotiations were completed.7 In June 1992, a coalition of environmental groups issued a position paper proposing the formation of a North
American Commission on the Environment
In response to the proposal and to the general environmental criticism of NAFTA, the three governments agreed in principle to the formation of a North American Commission on the Environment (NACE or
the Commission)." The Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protec-

NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (June 24, 1992) [hereinafter USTR Hills]
(summarizing a letter from U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills to Sen. Max
Baucus); President Bush Announces NAFTA Accord, But Labor, Others Promise Renewed Attack, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1375 (Aug. 12, 1992) (describing Hills'
statement at a press briefing); Reilly Says NAFTA First Trade Pact With Sustainable
Development As A Goal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1387 (Aug. 12, 1992) (quoting
EPA Administrator William K. Reilly's characterization of the NAFTA negotiations as
resulting in "the greenest international trade treaty the world has ever seen").
6. See H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 138 CONG. REC. H7698,
H7699 (Aug. 6, 1992) (rejecting a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement that is incompatible with U.S. health, safety, labor, and environmental laws). The resolution was nonbinding; it only expressed the view of Congress, and was passed unanimously. Id. at
7707.
7. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS
FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

TO NEGOTIATORS AND CONGRESS, WrrH MODEL LANGUAGE FOR KEY PROVISIONS,
POSITION PAPER, June 1992 [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS] (recommending
that NAFTA be modified to address environmental concerns). See also USTR Hills,
supra note 5 (citing 9 Int'l Trade Rep. 516 (Mar. 25, 1992) (reporting that an early
draft of NAFTA had been leaked to the press in March 1992, and that the Sierra
Club objected to language directed at protecting economic activity from environmental
standards)).
8. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7 (listing the organizations in
the environmental coalition as Arizona Toxics Information, Border Ecology Project,
Center for International Environmental Law, Community Nutrition Institute, Defenders
of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, Humane Society of
the United States, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, National Audobon Soci-

ety, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and Texas Center for Policy Studies). Mexican and
Canadian environmental groups are also taking an active role in the ongoing NAFTA

dialogue between environmental groups and the three governments. See Concerns of
North American Environmental Organizations Regarding the Trade Agreement, Open
Letter to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William K. Reilly, July
20, 1992 (reiterating the common concerns of environmental groups; signed by representatives of 51 groups from all three countries).
9. PRESS OFFICE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Press Release,
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tion Agency (EPA), the Canadian Minister of the Environment, and the
Mexican Secretary of Social Development met on September 17,
1992,"0 and proclaimed that NAFTA is the "most environmentally-sensitive trade agreement ever negotiated."'" The participating officials stipulated that environmental cooperation among NAFTA parties required full
respect for their national sovereignty. 2 They also agreed that any eventual mechanism for environmental cooperation would provide appropriate
opportunities for public participation." In addition, the participants
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Education."
They did not, however, agree on the structure or functions of the proposed Commission. Instead, they decided to have their officials meet
again in early 1993"to negotiate the formation of NACE. 6
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest an ideal outcome for the
negotiations. This Comment compares the existing NACE proposals with
two functioning models of international environmental cooperation: (1)
The International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada
(UIC); 17 and (2) the Article 169 complaint procedure utilized by the
Sept. 18, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Press Release].

10. Id
11.
12.
parties
13.

rl at 2.
See itd at I (recognizing that environmental cooperation among the NAFTA
is subject to national sovereignty).
Ia at 2.

14. PRESs OFFICE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
MEMoRANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION AMONG TIE
DEPARTMENr OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF CANADA, THE SEC=ErARIAT OF SOCIAL DEvEopPMrET REPUBUC OF MEXICO, AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Sept. 17, 1992. The Memorandum does not

mention a role for the proposed Commission. d Instead, it pledges the parties to
cooperate in promoting and developing programs on environmental education and
training. Id.art. IL For this purpose, they agreed to establish a trilateral committee,
seemingly unrelated to the larger North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation. IaL art. IV. The Memorandum was explicitly intended to highlight "the
commitment to increased cooperation" among the parties. Press Release, supra note 9,
at 3.
15. Press Release, supra note 9, at 4.
16. See generally OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
DRAFT OUTLINE FOR TRILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSION, Sept. 16, 1992 (outlining the initial proposal by the United States for a North American Commission on
the Environment) [hereinafter DRAFT OUTLINE]. The actual name of the proposed
Commission remains undecided. The draft outline uses North American Commission
on the Environment. Ia To eliminate confusion, the remainder of this Comment will
use this name or the resulting acronym.
17. See infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text (describing the history, structure
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Commission of the European Communities.'8 These two existing models
include structural and functional elements that suggest constructive modifications to the current NACE proposals. This Comment recommends a
NACE that incorporates positive aspects of both the IJC and European
Community (EC) procedure.
Part I of this Comment provides a background summary of the environmental provisions of the NAFTA draft. Part II outlines the original
and subsequent Commission proposals. Part III describes the IJC and the
Commission of the European Community's Article 169 complaint procedure, two functioning models of international environmental cooperation
and dispute resolution. Part IV analyzes how the IJC and the EC complaint procedure have functioned in practice. Part IV also compares the
existing NACE proposals with the organizational and structural components of both models. Part V recommends what may be considered ideal
components of an effective NACE, and also considers alternative structures and functions for the NACE.
I. BACKGROUND ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS OF
NAFTA
While NAFrA may be the "most environmentally-sensitive trade
agreement ever negotiated," 9 the draft agreement contains relatively
few specific references to the environment." The NAFTA Preamble
commits the agreement's signatories to promoting sustainable development and strengthening the enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations.2 Article 104 provides that the trade obligations stemming
from five international environmental agreements will supersede NAFTA
provisions in the event that the other treaty's provisions are inconsistent
with NAFTA.' In addition, Chapter Seven of NAFTA addresses sani-

and functions of the International Joint Commission (JC)).
18. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], art. 169.
19. Press Release, supra note 9, at 2.
20. See NAFTA, supra note 2 (incorporating fewer than a dozen sections referring specifically to the environment or environmental regulations). The environment, or
environmental laws and standards, are specifically referred to in the Preamble, Article
104 and Annex 104, Article 904, Article 906, Article 909, Article 915, and Article
1114. I& While the entire agreement is approxiamtely one thousand pages, environmental provisions represent only a tiny portion of the text.
21. Id. Preamble.
22. See id art. 104 (specifying three treaties: Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973; the Montreal Protocol

1993]

STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL MODELS

905

tary and phytosanitary measures.'
Chapter Nine of NAFTA concerns environmental standards more
explicitly, but primarily as a technical barrier to trade.2 ' Article 904
stipulates that the parties may adopt, maintain, and apply standards-related measures, including those intended to protect the environment.1 The
parties have the right to establish their own appropriate levels of protection, provided that they pursue "legitimate" objectives.' The parties

on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, as amended June 29,
1990; and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989 (applying upon entry into force
for Canada, Mexico, and the United States)). See also id. Annex 104.1 (adding two
bilateral agreements to the list- the Agreement Between the Government of Canada
and the Government of the United States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986; and the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement), Aug. 14,
1983). In addition, the parties are permitted to amend Annex 104.1 to include any
other environmental or conservation agreement. Id. art. 104.
23. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 7, Subch. B, art. 766 et seq. (defining
sanitary and phytosanitary measures as measures protecting human, animal, and plant
life from diseases, disease-causing organisms, pests, and contaminants and toxins in
food, beverages, and feedstuffs). Although sanitary and phytosanitary measures may be
regarded as a subset of environmental regulations, the NAFTA definitions imply that
they are limited to those primarily natural hazards that are direct threats to human,
animal, or plant life. Id Under the NAFTA definitions, regulations that protect the
general environment from damages caused by human activities could not be considered sanitary or phytosanitary measures. Id. Examples of valid sanitary or
phytosanitary measures might include prohibitions on the importation of produce infested with fruit flies or coated with dangerous pesticide residues. rd Generally,
Chapter Seven of NAFTA acknowledges the parties' rights to adopt such measures,
and to establish appropriate levels of protection. Id arts. 754(1) and 754(2). These
rights are, however, subject to the qualifications that sanitary and phytosanitary measures should be based on relevant international standards, and should not create disguised restrictions on traide. Id arts. 755 and 754(6).
24. rd Ch. 9. Chapter Nine of NAFIA is entitled "Standards-Related Measures."
See id Part Three "Technical Barriers to Trade" (including only Chapter Nine). See
id art. 904 (enumerating safety, health, environmental, and consumer standards as
being permissible types of standards-related measures). Since the agreement treats
these standards as potential trade barriers, it is arguable that Chapter Nine was designed to preclude such standards from impinging on trade.
25. See id art. 904(1) (allowing the parties to adopt, maintain, and apply standards-related measures).
26. See id art. 904(2) (permitting parties to establish a level of environmental
protection consistent with legitimate objectives). See also id.art. 915(1) (defining
legitimate objectives to include safety, the protection of human, animal, or plant life
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may prohibit the importation of goods that do not comply with applicable standards-related measures.27 The parties, however, must grant the
other parties non-discriminatory treatment, and may not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.' Article 906(1) commits the parties to joint
enhancement of the level of environmental protection. 9 Article 906(2)
states that the parties will endeavor to make their standards-related measures compatible?
Chapter Nine also requires notice, notification of the other parties, and
publication when a party wishes to adopt or modify a technical regulation." Article 913 establishes a committee on standards-related measures which will monitor and report annually on the implementation and
administration of the Chapter Nine provisions, assist in the harmonization of standards-related measures, provide a forum for consultations
between the parties, and otherwise improve cooperation with regard to

or health, protection of the environment, protection of consumers, and sustainable
development). The protection of domestic production is not a legitimate objective. Id.
27. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 904, para. 1.
28. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 904, paras. 3-4 (prohibiting respectively discriminatory treatment and unnecessary obstacles to trade). See also id. art. 905, para.
I (requiring the parties to use applicable international standards as the basis for their
own standards-related measures, unless such international standards are inadequate to
fulfill their legitimate objectives). But see it art. 904, pare. 3 (enabling the parties to
adopt higher standards to achieve their legitimate objectives).
29. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 906, paras. 1-2 (obligating the parties to
make their standards-related measures compatible for the purpose of promoting trade,
subject to the qualification that this must be done without reducing standards). Taken
together, the provisions of this article could imply a commitment to upward harmonization of environmental standards. See id. (advocating the enhancement of standardized
protections). A modest incentive towards upward harmonization is built into Article
906(4), which states that "[ejach importing Party shall treat a technical regulation
adopted or maintained by an exporting Party as equivalent to its own where the exporting Party . . . demonstrates to the satisfaction of the importing Party that its technical regulation adequately fulfills the importing Party's legitimate objectives." Id. art.
906, pare. 4. Along with the Article 904(1) provision allowing the parties to prohibit
the importation of goods that do not meet their standards, this provision could enable
the party with the highest environmental standards to encourage the other parties to
set more stringent standards. See iU. art. 906, para. 2 (stating that standardization shall
be achieved without reducing the environmental protections of any party).
30. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 906, para. 2.
31. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 909, para. 1(a) (requiring a party that intends
to adopt or modify a technical regulation to publish notice, and to notify the other
parties in writing). See also id art. 909, para. l(c) (requiring the party to provide a
copy of the proposed measures to any party or interested person requesting one).
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standards-related measures." Article 914 is a modest dispute resolution
provision, enabling the parties to request that the committee facilitate
consultations on the matter at issue." The party claiming that another
party's standards-related measure is inconsistent with Chapter Nine must
establish the inconsistency.?
Chapter Eleven addresses the environmental consequences of investment, and contains the last major environmental provisions of
NAFTA' Article 1114(1) allows parties to adopt, maintain, and enforce measures that require investments to be undertaken in an environmentally sensitive manner.' Article 1114(2) asserts that parties should
not waive or derogate from their environmental laws for the purpose of
promoting investment? This provision does not appear to create a
binding obligation on the parties."

32. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 913.
33. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 914 (explaining how a party may initiate
technical consultations).
34. NAFMA, supra note 2, arL 914. This provision protects the higher standards
of any party by requiring that the complaining party initially carry the burden of
proof by showing that a disputed standard is in fact a disguised barrier to trade. Id
The technical consultations outlined in this provision have no binding result. rd art.
914, para. 1. However, if the parties so agree, Article 914 consultations may constitute consultations within the broader dispute resolution framework provided for in
Chapter Twenty. Id art. 914, para. 2; see also id art. 2006 (creating and delineating
the formal consultations procedure). Disputes that are not resolved by consultations
could be referred to the NAFIA Free Trade Commission, established under Article
2001. See if/ art 2007 (stipulating how consultations may be referred to the trade
commission). If the trade commission fails to resolve the issue, one or more of the
parties may request the establishment of an arbitral panel. Id. art. 2008.
35. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1114, para. 2 (disapproving of the practice of
promoting investment by lowering environmental standards).
36. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1114, para. 1.
37. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1114, para. 2.
38. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1114, para. 2 (disapproving of the loosening
of environmental standards to promote economic development). This provision states
that the "Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing
domestic health, safety, or environmental measures." Id It also says they should not
waive or derogate from such measures. Id If the parties had intended this provision
to create a binding obligation, it would read "may not" instead of "should not." Cf
id art. 1110, para. I (forbidding the expropriation of investments). When a party
considers that another party's acts are inconsistent with this provision, the complaining
party may request consultations with the other patty. See Id art. 1114, para. 2 (establishing a consultation procedure). Article 1114(2) consultations cannot be appealed,
unike the consultations envisaged in other parts of NAFTA. Id art. 1114, para. 2;
see also id arts. 2007-08 (describing the mediation and arbitration procedures to be
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The foregoing summary of NAFrA's environmental provisions demonstrates that the NAFTA draft addresses the environment as a secondary issue. NAFFA does contain some provisions to benefit the environment, but it does not create a means of implementing those provisions.
The proposal to create a North American Commission on the Environment is an attempt to remedy this deficiency. Specifically, the proposed
NACE addresses the following five concerns: (1) increased environmental degradation as a result of increased trade and economic growth; (2)
the potential creation of pollution havens; (3) inadequate funding for increased environmental enforcement; (4) little or no public participation
in the resolution of environmental disputes; and (5) the prevention of
downward harmonization of environmental standards? 9 NACE should
address these concerns to ensure that an organization exists to implement the environmental goals suggested in NAFTA. The balance of this
Comment will discuss how the parties could create an effective NACE
based on the current proposals, and on the experiences of two existing
forums for the resolution of international environmental disputes.
II. EXISTING COMMISSION PROPOSALS
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION PROPOSAL

The environmental group coalition ' has generally advocated a NACE
with adequate funding, broad monitoring and reporting duties, the power
to receive and investigate complaints, and extensive non-governmental
organization (NGO) and public participation." Such an organization

used if consultation fails to resolve the dispute).
39. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 1. See also Justin Ward &
Glenn T. Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade Agreement, ENVIRONMENT, May 1992,
at 44; H.R. Con. Res. 246, supra note 6, at H7701 (statement of Rep. Collins) (arguing that trade agreements may create strong incentives for U.S. firms to relocate to
countries where environmental regulations are weaker than in the United States);
USTR Hills, supra note 5 (reporting an exchange of letters between Sen. Max Baucus
and U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, in which Sen. Baucus wrote that harmonization of environmental standards should be towards the higher standard; Hills replied that there will be no downward harmonization under NAFTA). But see HIGHUGHTS, supra note 1, Environment (fact sheet) at 2 (maintaining that pollution havens
are a myth because environmental compliance costs are relatively small for most industries; that Mexico's environmental laws are similar to U.S. laws; and that Mexico
has greatly increased its enforcement efforts).
40. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the organizations in the
coalition).
41. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing
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would require sufficient funding to employ a professional staff and carry
out the duties assigned to it.! Possible sources of funding include public funds or special taxes on the expanded trade and investment resulting
from NAFrA.!' The June 1992 coalition proposal suggested that four
members from each NAFTA party be appointed to the Commission."
The proposed Commission would monitor the adoption and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, as well as industrial compliance.' Towards this end, the Commission would issue annual reports
detailing its findings. " The annual reports would include a broad range
of information on all aspects of the parties' environmental programs.f
potential environmental consequences of NAFTA and proposing the NACE as a partial
solution to these problems); see also Memorandum on the North American Environmental Commission, from Justin Ward and Lynn Fischer, National Resources Defense
Council, to Tfim Atleson et aL, Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 20, 1992)
[hereinafter Memorandum] [on file with the American University Journal of International Law and Policy] (enumerating the specific concerns of the environmental coalition and proposing a North American Environmental Commission).
42. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2 (providing model lan-

guage for a treaty establishing a NACE); see also iL at 10 (suggesting that, in addition to establishing the NACE, the U.S. and Canada increase their bilateral aid to
Mexico for the purpose of funding environmental activities them, and suggesting that
the parties tax some of the revenues resulting from increased trade and investment,
and earmark funds specifically for environmental purposes). See also Ward and
Prickett, supra note 39, at 44-45 (recommending that a tax on trade be dedicated to
environmental protection).
43. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 10; Ward and Prickett, supra

note 39, at 44-45.
44. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2 (stipulating that Com-

mission members should have demonstrated expertise in environmental science and
policy and no vested economic interest in trade or investment arising under NAFrA).
45. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2 (outlining the moni-

toring functions of the proposed NACE).
46. See ENvIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2-3 (requiring the pro-

posed NACE to publish a regular report on the adoption and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations).
47. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2-3. Among the possible
report contents enumerated in the June proposal are: effects of standards harmonization under NAFrA; the parties' participation in, and adherence to, international environmental agreements; status of legislative actions and administrative regulations;
changes in the structure and functions of regulatory agencies; detailed discussion of
administrative and judicial enforcement, including citizen actions; recommendations
regarding areas where the parties need to strengthen their regulatory requirements in
order to prevent environmental degradation; programs and means to reduce the use of
hazardous and toxic materials; verification that the parties have adequate infrastructure
for the handling of hazardous and toxic materials; and poaching and illegal trade in
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The parties would provide the Commission with the documents and
information required to complete the reports.' The Commission, in
turn, would disseminate its report to the public."
The Commission would receive complaints from governments, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens, alleging the failure of the parties to enforce their environmental laws, or abide by international environmental agreements." The Commission would .then investigate the
bases for complaints, and conduct independent monitoring and inspections." If an investigation revealed violations, the Commission would
file a formal notice with the violating party." A party receiving notice
would have sixty days to inform the Commission of corrective steps
taken.3 If the violating party failed to respond, the Commission would
fully describe the party's failure in its annual report.' The coalition
proposal does not envision further action by the Commission." It could
wild fauna and flora. Id. at 2-4.

48. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 3 (specifying the information the parties should be required to provide for the NACE).
49. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4 (proposing a process
by which the public would be informed of NACE findings). The annual reports would
be disseminated with the aid of local citizens committees. Id. at 2; see also iU. (requiring the parties to foster such committees and stating that the role of the committees is: 1) to make and to implement recommendations on local environmental issues;
2) to assist the Commission in the collection of data; and 3) to act as liaison between the Commission and local communities affected by NAFTA). To the extent that
this committee proposal is practicable, it would be an effective way of giving the
Commission a direct connection with the general public. See Memorandum, supra note
41 (suggesting that citizen's groups would provide the Commission with investigative
evidence in addition to disseminating Commission findings). However, the June 1992
proposal contains no suggestion as to how the committees would be constituted, how
or whether they would be funded, or how they would interact with governmental
entities. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2. Also, the suggestion that
the national governments foster the development of the committees implies some
element of governmental control over their composition and activities. Id.
50. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4 (specifying that a
complainant's identity may remain confidential at their request). See also itt (requiring
the parties to agree not to take any retaliatory actions against complainants).
51. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2-4. The parties would also
be required to provide documents and information for the purpose of furthering the
investigation. Id at 4.
52. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4 (obliging the parties to

provide notice that would specify the nature of the violation, as well as the remedial
steps the violating party would be required to take).
53. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4.
54. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4.
55. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 4. But see id. at 1 (suggest-
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hear complaints, but its only effective sanction would be its ability to
publicize a failure to act.
B. THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL
The coalition proposal embodies a NACE with a limited ability to
address complaints from the public. The NACE proposed by the United
States government would not have this function." Instead, the NACE
proposed by the United States government would be almost exclusively
an advisory body.Y The outline of the proposal does not identify a
funding source."S The Commission would be composed of the United
States EPA Administrator and the analogous Mexican and Canadian
ministers." The draft outline does not specify that the Commission will
have any professional staff, other than the staffs of the three national
environmental agencies.
The Commission would have some monitoring functions, and a general duty to facilitate implementation of the environmental provisions of
NAF7A.6" It would answer inquiries concerning NAFrA environmental

ing that the Commission is empowered to arbitrate disputes where a NAFTA party
establishes that it is losing industry because of another party's weak environmental
laws or enforcement). See also id. (proposing that if no steps are taken to correct the
enforcement problem, the complainant could impose compensating duties on the relevant products of the other party). The proceeds from these duties would then be used
to correct the problem at issue. Id; cf id. at 2-4 (failing to mention such an arbitration function in the draft agreement which follows the introductory text of the coalition proposal).
56. See DRAFr OUTLINF, supra note 16 (providing no mechanism by which the
NACE would address or resolve environmental complaints or disputes).
57. See DRAFt OUTLiNE, supra note 16, art. I (limiting the purposes of the Commission as envisaged by the United States). The United States envisages NACE as
providing: "[a] forum for the discussion of environmental issues; . .. [a] means of
encouraging and supporting cooperation on environmental matters and solutions to
environmental problems;. and ... [a] mechanism for coordinating environmental expertise and information." Id
58. See DRAFr OUTLINE, supra note 16 (omitting any information as to how the
NACE would be funded).
59. Letter from Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative, to Jay Hair,
President, National Wildlife Federation (Sept. 29, 1992) (on file with the National
Wildlife Federation).
60. See DRAFr OUTLINE, supra note 16 (excluding discussion of NACE staffing
needs).
61. See DRAFt OUMi supra note 16, art. I (limiting monitoring activities to
reviewing the extent to which the NAFTA parties have implemented the environmental provisions of the agreement). See also supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text
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disputes, and would lend its expertise to NAFrA dispute resolution
panels."1 As in the coalition proposal, the Commission would issue an
annual report as a means of disseminating information about environmental protection activities.' The Commission would also serve as a
forum for identifying and discussing means of enhancing environmental
cooperation among the parties. ' Lastly, the United States government
proposal would provide some limited means of public participation in
the activities of the Commission.'

(summarizing the environmental provisions of NAFTA). But see Memorandum, supra
note 41 (criticizing this proposal as placing too narrow a limit on the scope of the
Commission's work). Increased trade and economic integration could affect many
environmental issues that are not within the purview of the environmental provisions
in NAFTA. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at i-i.
62. DRAFn OUTuNE, supra note 16, art. 11(B). See NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
2008 (providing for the formation of NAFTA dispute panels when parties are unable
to resolve a dispute through consultation or the good offices of the NAFTA Trade
Commission); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining how an
environmental dispute among the NAFTA parties might result in formal consultations
and the eventual use of an arbitral panel).
63. See DRAFT OUTLINE, supra note 16, art. 11(B) (listing possible appropriate
contents of the annual report as: information on the parties' progress in strengthening
and enforcing their environmental laws; review of enforcement actions taken; environmental recommendations; a summary of the implementation of international environmental agreements by the parties; and other relevant information). With regard to the
annual report contents, there is a striking difference in tone between proposals of the
United States and that of the environmental coalition. Unsurprisingly, the government
proposal implies an annual report that would focus on the parties' environmental
achievements. Id. The coalition proposal emphasizes the Commission's role as an
environmental guardian. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2-4. Thus, In
the coalition proposal, the Commission reports on the adoption and enforcement of
environmental laws, rather than reviewing progress. Id at 3. More importantly, the
coalition proposal requires reports on industrial compliance, regulatory delay, changes
in administrative structure, and progress towards achieving adequate funding of environmental programs. Id. at 3-4. Under the coalition proposal, the report would also be
issued in draft form and be subject to public notice and comment. Id. See also supra
notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing the contents of the Commission's annual report under the environmental coalition proposal).
64. See DRAFT OuTUNE, supra note 16, art. II(C) (suggesting that the Commission identify trans-boundary environmental problems, formulate cooperative responses,
and coordinate environmental expertise and information).
65. See DRAFT OUTLINE, supra note 16, art. 1(D) (allowing some sessions of the
Commission's annual meetings to be open to the public and entitling the public to
make written submissions to the Commission). The parties could also establish "public
advisory committees" to advise their Commission representatives. Id. Such committees
would include representatives from citizen groups, environmental organi7zations, state
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If the NACE that ultimately emerges resembles the current United
States government proposal, it will perhaps facilitate closer environmental cooperation among the NAFTA parties. The Commission would be
composed of officials who already have the task of carrying out the environmental policies of their governments.' It would be advised by a
public committee composed of individuals whose voices, for the most
part, are already influential in the debate on environmental issuesG The
Commission would issue an annual report that would highlight actions
taken, although the report would limit or omit discussion of problems
remaining to be solved.' In contrast, the environmental coalition proposal clearly embodies a stronger and more activist Commission. In
order to understand what the elements of a successful NACE might be,
and possibly to improve upon the existing NACE proposals, it is useful
to examine functioning models of international environmental cooperation.
IlL POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE COMMISSION
A. THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
Many commentators regard the International Joint Commission as a
highly successful forum for managing international environmental issues.' The I.J.C. was established pursuant to the Boundary Waters

and local governments, industry, labor, and academia; but, they would not be as
broadly based as the local citizens committees outlined in the environmental coalition
proposal, nor would they have the same monitoring functions. Id; cf. supra note 48
and accompanying text (detailing the role of local citizens committees in the coalition
proposal).
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. government

proposal for the composition of the NACE).
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (specifying the makeup of the proposed public advisory committees).
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (summarizing the contents and
weaknesses of the annual report envisioned in the U.S. government proposal).
69. See, e.g., ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 162

(1983) (noting that the role of the U.C. has expanded and suggesting that it has been
given more responsibilities because the governments of Canada and the United States

are satisfied with the way it has performed its duties); Timothy h. Gulden, Comment,
lransfrontierPollution and the International Joint Commission: A Superior Means of
Dispute Resolution, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 43, 58 (1987) (arguing that the .. C. can be

credited with successfully resolving environmental disputes between the United States
and Canada); Keith A. Henry, Transboundary Pollution and the International Joint
Commission, in COMMON BOUNDARYICO?.ZION PROBLEMS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
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Treaty of 1909.20 Its primary purpose is to prevent and resolve environmental disputes between the United States and Canada.' The I.JC.
is composed of three commissioners from each country. One commissioner from each country is a co-chair. '2 A professional staff and a
number of advisory boards assist the I.J.C. in its work." As of 1988,
the I.J.C. had addressed 110 issues and disputes, the vast majority related to water diversions and water pollution.'
The I.J.C. carries out duties resulting from two different procedures:
applications and references. ' Under articles III, IV, and VIII of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, the I.J.C. has mandatory jurisdiction over
applications. 6 An entity planning to construct a dam that would raise
SEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION

47 (1982) (explaining why the I.J.C. has been

successful in resolving environmental disputes between the United States and Canada).
70. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448,
2451 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
71. See generally INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION: WHAT IT IS, How IT WoRxs (summarizing the purposes of the IJ.C.).
72.

See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

ACriVITIES 1987-1988 4 (1988) [hereinafter I.J.C. ACTIVMES] (describing the appointment and functions of I.J.C. Commissioners). The Commissioners are appointed
by their respective governments, but they are not supposed to represent the governments. Instead, their task is to seek a common, non-partisan solution in the interest of
both the United States and Canada. Id; see also Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note
70, art. XI (requiring the Commissioners to make a solemn declaration that they will
faithfully and impartially carry out their duties); Jennifer Woodward, Note, International Pollution Control: The United States and Canada - The International Joint Coinmission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 344 n.167 (1988) (citing INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON WATER QUALITY 11
(1978)) (noting that the I.J.C. has been generally very impartial in its decisions). By
1978, the IJ.C. had dealt with more than 100 cases and divided its opinions along
national lines only three times. Id.
73. See I.J.C. ACTIvITIES, supra note 72, at 5, 8 (stating that the I.J.C. has headquarters in Ottawa and Washington, D.C., and a regional office in Windsor, Ontario);
see also id. at 19-31, 43 (listing and summarizing the activities of more than 20
existing advisory boards, of which the most important are the Great Lakes Water
Quality Board and the Great Lakes Scientific Advisory Board).
74. See I.J.C. ACTIVITIES, supra note 72, at 32-42 (listing I.J.C. dockets since the
inception of the Commission in 1912). The I.J.C. has also considered trans-boundary
air pollution issues in Docket Nos. 61R (air pollution in the Windsor-Detroit area
from vessels in 1949), 85R (study of air pollution in the Detroit-St. Clair River area
in 1966), and 99R (air quality - Michigan and Ontario in 1975). Id. at 37-41.
75. See I.J.C. ACVrITIES, supra note 72, at 4 (explaining the application and
reference procedures).
76. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, arts. III, IV, and VII (defining
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the level of waters on the other side of the international boundary must
apply for and receive permission from the I.J.C2" The same restriction
applies to an entity planning a water diversion that would raise or reduce a flow on the other side of the boundary.!' The LT.C., however,
has rarely disapproved an application.'
Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty is the basis for the I.J.C.
reference procedure.'s Using this procedure, one or both parties may
refer a matter to the I.J.C. for resolution. " The I.J.C. then investigates

the powers of the J.C.). Article III requires IJ.C. approval for any new uses, obstructions, or diversions of boundary waters that would affect the natural level or flow
on either side of the boundary. I&, at art. II. However, the governments may supersede LU.C. authority by special agreement, and certain types of governmental projects
are exempt (1e. dredging, improvements of harbors). rd. Article IV requires IJ.C.
approval for the construction and maintenance of dams and remedial or protective
works on one side of the boundary that would raise the level of waters on the other
side. Id. at art. IV. Again, the governments may circumvent the LJ.C. by special
agreement. Id Article IV further provides that "boundary waters and waters flowing
across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other." Id Article VIII specifies that- "[t]his International Joint
Commission shall have jurisdiction over and shall pass upon all cases involving the
use or obstruction of waters with respect to which under Articles M and IV of this
Treaty the approval of this Commission is required ... " Id. art. VIIL Article VIII
then delineates the principles governing the LJ.C.'s decisions. Id Article VIII describes a hierarchy of uses for boundary waters with domestic and sanitary uses having priority over navigation, and navigation having priority over power and irrigation
uses. The principle states that both parties have equal rights in the use of the boundary waters. Id
77. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. Ill.
78. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. IV.
79. See UI.C. ACTIvn-Es, supra note 72, at 32-42 (noting the dispositions of all
U.C. dockets). In fact, out of 60 applications received between 1912 and 1986, only
one was not approved (Docket No. 31A, Madawaska Company - Grand Falls Dam on
Saint John River), and this may have been disapproved only because a competing
application for the same project had already been approved (Docket No. 22A, Saint
John River and Power Company - Grand Falls Dam on Saint John River). rd. In
eight other cases, consideration was postponed, no action was taken, or the application
was withdrawn. Id.
80. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art IX (agreeing that the parties
may refer disputes to the I.J.C. for resolution).
81. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art IX (stipulating that when
the parties have a dispute regarding conditions along the international border, they
may refer the matter to IJ.C. for examination and report). An LJ.C. staff member
commented that, although the Boundary Waters Treaty provides for unilateral references, it would be very difficult for the L.C. to make a full inquiry without the
active cooperation of both parties. Interview with Frank Bevacqua, Public Information
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the matter at issue, and reports its conclusions and recommendations.'
The I.J.C. recommendations are not decisions, and have no binding
authority over the governments.' Yet, the American and Canadian governments frequently implement the I.JC. recommendations.'
The Boundary Waters Treaty also grants arbitration powers to the
I.JC., but only when both parties consent to referring a matter for arbitration.' The parties, however, have never done so." On one important occasion where Canada and the United States submitted an environmental dispute to arbitration, they created a separate arbitration tribunal,
rather than refer the matter to the I.J.C. Although the tribunal in that

Officer, IJ.C., in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 1992). To date, all references to the
IJ.C. have been jointly referred to the IJ.C. by both governments. Id.
82. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. IX (describing steps that
IJ.C. must take under the reference procedure).
83. See Boundary Waters Testy, supra note 70, art. IX.
84. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 339 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SE'rLaicEMNT OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTEs BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 10 (1979)) (asserting that the two governments have accepted the I.C.'s

recommendations in eighty percent of the referred disputes).
85. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. X (specifying the arbitration
procedure and granting the I.J.C. powers of decision if both parties agree to submit
an issue for a binding decision). The article states:

Any questions or matters of difference arising between the High Contracting
Parties . . . may be referred for decision to the International Joint Commission
A majority of the said Commission shall
by consent of the two Parties ....
have the power to render a decision or finding as to any questions or matters
so referred.
Id
86. LJ.C. ACTIVITES, supra note 72, at 5.
87. See Gulden, supra note 69, at 50, 50 n.68 (citing Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941), employing a special arbitration
panel to resolve an environmental dispute between the United States and Canada). In
Trail Smelter, sulfur dioxide fumes from a smelter in British Columbia were damaging agricultural and timber land in the State of Washington. Id at 51. Canada and
the United States engaged in diplomatic negotiations for two years before agreeing to
establish an arbitration tribunal. Id. The tribunal resolved the dispute by setting a
strict limit on the permissible output of sulfur dioxide from the smelter. I, More
importantly, the tribunal decision announced that:
[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. (citing Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1966). Because of this
declaration, Trail Smelter is one of the few cases that can be cited for the proposition that states may be held liable for environmental damage which they cause in the
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case supposedly had binding powers of decision, it did not have real
enforcement powers.' Similarly, even if a matter were referred to the
LJ.C. for arbitration, its decisional and enforcement powers would be
limited.98
In addition to responding to an application or reference, the IJ.C.
m ' When the LJ.C.
must also discharge other ongoing responsibilities
approves an application, the approval may be subject to terms and conditions set by the IJ.C. The I.J.C. must monitor compliance with these
conditions? When the IJ.C. responds to a reference, it will eventually
report its recommendations to the United States and Canadian governments.' If the governments accept the recommendations, they may assign the I.J.C. a monitoring or coordinating role in implementing the
recommendations. 3
The IJ.C. generally lacks implementation and enforcement powers.'
Furthermore, the L.C. cannot initiate its own investigations; it can only
respond to references and applications." An organization with more
comprehensive legal powers might prove a more effective guardian of
environmental values. One such organization is the Commission of the
European Community.

territory of other states. Id. at 50-51.

88. See George Alexandrowicz, A Proposal to Assist the Resolution of Environmental Disputes Between Canada and the United States, in CO.zMON BouNDARYICOMMON PROBLEMS: THE ENvIRONhENTAL CONSEQUENCES Or ENERGY PRODUC-

TION 58 (1982) (arguing that the voluntary compliance of the smelter company obviat-

ed the problem of enforcing the Trail Smelter decision).
89. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, Art. X (permitting parties to

impose restrictions and exceptions in the terms of a reference for L.C. arbitration). In
addition, the treaty does not grant the IJ.C. any independent enforcement powers. Id.
Thus, an J.C. arbitration decision could only be enforced to the extent that the losing party (or the losing party's court) is willing to be bound by it. See supra note
81 (reporting an LI.C. staff member's comment that the LJ.C. would find it difficult
to resolve any reference without cooperation of both parties).
90. See IJ.C. AcIrnIEs, supra note 72, at 4 (noting that references and applications may lead to ongoing responsibilities).

91. U.C. ACrIVrTEs, supra note 72, at 4.
92. L.C. ACTvTIEs, supra note 72, at 4.
93. LJ.C. AcrwrIvrS, supra note 72, at 4.
94. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 344 (noting that the IJ.C. must rely on the
governments of the United States and Canada to implement IJ.C recommendations).
95. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 343-44. But see supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (recognizing that the LI.C. rarely uses its mandatory authority to
disapprove an application, while the Canadian and United States governments usually
accept the U.C. recommendations resulting from their voluntary references).
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THE ARTICLE 169 COMPLAINT PROCEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY

The European Community (EC) is a supranational organization, to
which the member states have ceded certain aspects of their sovereignty.' In matters where the EC has jurisdiction, EC law takes precedence
over member state laws when the two conflictY The Single European
Act of 198798 (SEA) formally granted the EC the power to enact environmental legislation.' Even prior to the SEA, however, the EC had
passed environmental acts under the authority of two general provisions
of the EEC Treaty.'

96. See KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC oF COMMUNYry LAW 9 (1991)
(describing the legal status of the European Community). The EC is actually comprised of three communities, founded under three separate treaties: The European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom),
and the European Economic Community (EEC). Id. at 5. Although the three communities have never formally merged, they are now generally regarded as part of a
single entity called the European Community. Id. at 6. The EC currently has twelve
member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 5.
97. See id. at 42 (delineating the extent of EC authority relative to member
states). Areas of EC competence include free movement of goods, workers and capital, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, and co-ordinated regulation
of agriculture, transport policy, social policy, and competition. Id at 5-6.
98. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, O.J. L169/1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
The SEA was a set of amendments to the EEC Treaty. Owen Lomas, Environmental
Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 MCGILL L.J. 506,
512 (1988).
99. See generally Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic
Community. New Powers Under the Single European Act, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 249, 267 (1991) (analyzing how the Single European Act strengthens the basis
for EC environmental legislation and regulation). See also EEC Treaty, supra note 18,
arts. 130(r) and 130(s) (defining the permissible objectives and scope of EC environmental legislation, as well as the procedural requirements for enactment).
100. See Lomas, supra note 98, at 510 (depicting the weak legal foundation of
EC environmental legislation prior to passage of the Single European Act). Articles
100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty were read to imply EC authority to enact environmental measures. Id. Article 100 provides, in part:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission,
issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.
EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 100.
Article 235 provides:
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The basic institutions of the EC are the Council, the Commission (EC
Commission), the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice."' The EC Commission and Council, in consultation with the Parliament, enact three different types of binding legislation:' 1) regula-

If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
rd art 235.
Although the original EEC Treaty did not explicitly contain environmental objectives, the EC Commission asserted that the economic goals of the Treaty encompassed environmental issues, and that environmental policies had a direct impact on
the establishment and function of the EC. See Lomas, supra note 98, at 511 (discussing the impact of environmental issues on the EC); see also Fredrick C. Eisenstein,
Comment, Economic Implications of European Transfrontier Pollution: National Prerogative and Attribution of Responsibility, 11 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 519, 528
(1981) (contending that inconsistent national environmental standards threatened the
goal of EC economic integration). Cf ENVIRONMUTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7
(arguing that the linkage between increased trade under NAFTA and a potential increase in environmental degradation, requires the creation of a North American Commission on Trade and the Environment).
101. See BORCHARDT, supra note 96, at 7-9 (describing the legal organization of
the EC). The Council is the primary legislative body of the EC, and exercises some
executive authority over the coordination of member state economic policies. Zacker,
supra note 99, at 253. Council members are usually the member state ministers
whose portfolios include the issue under discussion, and they serve as advocates for

their government's positions. Id The Commission is a quasi-executive body with some
power to initiate legislation. Id Its seventeen members are appointed, and are required
to defend the interests of the Community relative to the interests of the individual
member states. Id Thus, the Commission is required to ensure that the provisions of
the EEC Treaty and EC legislation are implemented. Eam.E NOEL, WORMNG TOGEMER - THE INSTIrU= oNS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 11 (1991).
The European Parliament does not have the legislative powers of most national
parliaments, although it must be consulted when the EC Commission and the Council
are considering major legislation. rdL at 29. It also controls some portions of the EC
budget. If at 27. These include the costs of operating EC institutions and certain
special EC funds (i.e. Social Fund, Regional Fund, research and energy, industrial
policy). If The European Court of Justice is the interpreter of Community law, as
opposed to the law of member states. Id- at 32. It has jurisdiction over cases in
which member states are accused of infringing or failing to implement Community
law, and cases challenging some action of the other EC institutions. Id. The European
Court may also give preliminary rulings on questions referred by the national courts
of member states, when the latter are dealing with cases requiring interpretations of
Community law. I
102. See BORCHARDT, supra note 96, at 26 (describing the process by which EC
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tions; 2) directives; and 3) decisions." ' The EC Commission has the
duty of ensuring that EC legislation is implemented in the member
states.'O'
The EC Commission fulfills this duty in many ways, and the Article
169 complaint procedure is one of its most powerful tools." Under
Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, any member of the public may bring a
complaint before the EC Commission, alleging an ififringement of Community law."r The EC Commission also has authority to initiate Arti-

institutions make Community laws). All legislation enacted by EC institutions is
known as secondary legislation. IR at 25. The term "primary legislation" refers to the
founding treaties of the three original communities. See id. at 5-6 (describing the
formation of the EC from the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom).
103. See BORCHARDT, supra note 96, at 26 (examining the different types of EC
legislation). Regulations apply uniformly throughout the EC, and they apply directly,
without the need for member states to pass implementing legislation. Id at 26. DIrectives apply to some or all member states, and they set general goals that the states
must achieve through the means of their choice. Id. at 27. Decisions apply in individual cases, and they order a member state, a firm, or an individual to do or refrain
from a particular act. Id. at 32. Decisions may also grant rights or impose duties on
the addressee. lo. There are also two non-binding types of actions, known as rccommendations and opinions. Id. Technically, actions under the authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community do not have the same names as actions by the EEC and
Euratom. Id at 26. The names and effects of ECSC actions are very similar to those
of the EEC and Euratom. Id. For the purposes of this comment, these distinctions are
immaterial.
104. See NOIL, supra note 101, at 11 (discussing the functions of the EC Commission); see also BRIAN MORRIS Er AL., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A GUIDE FOR
BusINEss AND GOVERNMENT 65 (1981) (noting that Directorate-General XI [Environment, Consumer Protection, and Nuclear Safety] is the subdivision of the EC Commission that addresses environmental issues).

105. See Richard Macrory, The Enforcement of Community Environmental Laws:
Some Critical Issues, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 347, 348 (1992) (asserting that the
Article 169 procedure is a key means of enforcing EC environmental laws).
106. EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 169. Article 169 reads:
If the Commission considers that a member state has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion. on the matter, after
giving the States concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.

IL
Notably, Article 169 does not address specific procedures. The EC
Commission's own internal rules of administration enable the general public, including
individuals, environmental groups and industries, to bring complaints before the Commission. Macrory, supra note 105, at 363.
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cle 169 actions on its own, unlike the I.J.C.'" Although Article 169
provisions cover all types of EC law, environmental matters are the
subject of a0 significant percentage of the Article 169 actions taken in a
given year.'
After receiving a complaint or otherwise detecting an infringement of
Community law, the EC Commission investigates the matter to determine if Commission action is necessary.'"' If an infringement
exists,
the EC Commission sends a formal letter of notice to the infringing
state."' The state must respond with comments within two months."'
If the state does not eliminate the offending practice, the EC Commission issues a "reasoned" opinion and the infringing state must comply
within a specified deadline."' If the infringing state remains recalci-

trant, the EC Commission may bring the case to the European Court of
Justice.'"
The EC Commission may settle the case during the first two stages of
an Article 169 proceeding."' Because of this alternative, there are
107. See EEC Treaty, supra note 18, art. 169 (providing for Commission action
when a member state is not fulfilling its treaty obligations).
108. See Ninth Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community Law, EC Commission, 1992 OJ. (C 250) 47
[hereinafter EC Commission] (tabulating the origin and status of Article 169 proceedings in the last decade). In 1991, 136 out of 877 Article 169 proceedings
(15.5%) were related to environmental and consumer protection matters. Id. at 47. The
equivalent figures for 1990 were 168 out of 960 (17.4%). Id Environmental grounds
formed the basis of 480 of the 1252 public complaints submitted in 1990 (38.3%).
Macrory, supra note 105, at 364. Equivalent data for 1991 are not available due to a
change in the methods of counting complaints. EC Commission, supra at 150 n.l.
The EC Commission received a total of 1,052 complaints from the public in
1991, and EC Commission staff itself initiated 381 Article 169 proceedings. Id. at 7.
Thus, the EC took no action with regard to 556 (1,052 + 381 - 877) of the public
complaints (assuming action was taken in all the cases initiated by the EC Commission). Public complaints were nevertheless the basis of the majority of the Article 169
actions taken (496 of 877). Id The EC Commission reported that of the 381 actions
taken on its own initiative, 125 actually resulted from Parliamentary questions and 17
resulted from petitions sent to the Parliament. Id
109. NoEL, supra note 101, at 11.
110. See Macrory, supra note 105, at 352 (analyzing the stages of an Article 169
procedure).
111. NoR[, supra note 101, at 11.
112. NoEL, supra note 101, at 11.
113. NoEl, supra note 101, at 11.
114. See Macrory, supra note 105, at 352 (characterizing the Article 169 procedure as one designed to encourage settlement between the EC Commission and the
offending member state).
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more letters of notice than there are opinions. Since the infringing state
may rectify its deficient enforcement of EC law after the issuance of an
opinion, even fewer cases are brought before the European Court.'"
An effective settlement is possible at each stage, and the environment
can benefit each time the EC Commission persuades a member state to
enforce EC environmental laws. When a case does reach the Court of
Justice, however, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain because the
Court cannot apply any effective sanctions to enforce its decisions."'
IV. ANALYSIS
The preceding section outlined the basic structure and workings of the
I.J.C. and the EC Article 169 procedure. The following analysis discusses how the models function in practice, and examines how the experiences of the models are relevant in the process of forming a North
American Commission on the Environment. This exercise seeks to compare the existing NACE proposals to the models, and to determine if
and how the current NACE proposals should be modified.
A. I.JC.

ACTIVITIES IN PRACTICE

In recent years, the I.JC. has focused much of its efforts on the Great
Lakes.' These activities have resulted primarily from the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement" 8 and the Great Lakes Levels Reference of
1986.1" The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was originally
115. EC Commission, supra note 108, at 47. In 1991, the EC Commission issued
877 letters of formal notice, 412 reasoned opinions, and 64 references to the Court of
Justice. Id. The respective figures for 1990 are 960, 251, and 77. Id. In this two year

period, more than 90% of the cases were resolved or settled without the Commission
referring the matter to the Court of Justice. Id.

116. See Zacker, supra note 99, at 255 (describing the limits of European Court
of Justice jurisdiction). The judgments of the Court are binding upon member states,
under Article 171 of the EEC Treaty. Md The only sanctions for failure to comply,
however, are additional procedures under Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
But see Macrory, supra note 105, at 368 n.44 (reporting that a pending proposal
would amend Article 171 of the Treaty to enable the European Court to impose
financial sanctions on member states that ignore its judgments).
117. Focus on International Joint Commission Activities, International Joint Commission [hereinafter Focus] (Jul./Aug. 1992). See also .C. AcTlvmEs, supra note 72
(describing the Commission's works in alleviating the adverse consequences of fluctuating water levels in the Great Lakes).
118. Revised Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, as amended by Protocol signed November 18, 1987, International Joint Commission (Sept. 1989).
119. See I.J.C. ACTIvITIEs, supra note 72, at 42 (discussing this reference). The
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signed in 1972;' a second version was signed in 19782 and amended in 1987.' The Great Lakes Water Quality Board and the Great
Lakes Science Advisory Board assist the I.IC. in its work under the
agreement?" The work performed under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement offers a good example of how the I.J.C. functions in
practice.
The original 1972 Agreement resulted from a 1964 reference asking
the I.C. to examine the problem of pollution in the lower Great
Lakes. ' Under the reference, the I.J.C. formed the International Lake
Erie Water Pollution Board and the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence River Water Pollution Board, both comprised of government officials, scientists, and engineers.' The boards investigated the pollution
problem in the lakes and submitted ten semi-annual progress reports to
the LI.C."' The LJ.C., in turn, submitted three interim reports to the
Canadian and American governments, determining that the primary cause
of deteriorating water quality in the lakes was enrichment by nutrients,
especially phosphorus. ' The investigatory boards sent a summary report to the LJ.C. in September 1969, and the I.J.C. released the report
to the public the following month."
Following release of the report, the LJ.C. held a series of public
hearings on pollution in the lakes." Next, the I.LC. released a final
docket number for the 1986 Great Lakes Reference is 111R. Id.
120. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great
Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301, TJ.A.S.
No. 7312 [hereinafter 1972 Agreement].
121. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great
Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.A.S.
No. 9257 thereinafter 1978 Agreement].
122. See Barry G. Rabe and Janet B. Zimmerman, Integrated Pollution Control: A
Symposium: Article: Cross-Media Environmental Integration in the Great Lakes Basin,
22 ENVTL. L. 253, 262 n.27 (1992) (discussing how amendments in 1987 supplemented the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement by calling on the LJ.C. to take
the dominant role in such areas as airborne deposits of toxic substances).
123. .J.C. ACnIVrls, supra note 72, at 19, 21.
124. LIC. AcnvrnMs, supra note 72, at 39.
125. Woodward, supra note 72, at 332.
126. Woodward, supra note 72, at 332.
127. Woodward, supra note 72, at 333.
128. Woodward, supra note 72, at 333.
129. Woodward, supra note 72, at 332. The hearings were held in several Great
Lakes Basin cities: Toronto, Ontario; Cleveland, Ohio; Toledo, Ohio; Hamilton, Ontario; Brockville, Ontario; and Rochester, New York. Ld. They provided an opportunity
for the IJ.C. to hear the testimony of approximately 180 witnesses. Id. Public hear-
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report in late 1970 on pollution in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the St.
Lawrence River." The report contained comprehensive recommendations, including water quality objectives, and requested that the governments give the I.J.C. expanded powers to coordinate, monitor, implement, and report on programs to preserve and improve the Great Lakes
water quality.' The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement responded directly to these recommendations." The 1972 Agreement
contained provisions reinforcing the mandates of I.J.C. under the Boundary Waters Treaty and subsequent legislation, and implementing many of
the recommendations in the 1970 J.C. report.'
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 addressed shortcomings in the 1972 Agreement." Since the 1978 Agreement, the

ings and meetings are often a part of IJ.C. operation. In the period from November
30, 1992 to February 25, 1993, eight public forums were held in eight cities, to
facilitate public comment on the draft recommendations resulting from the 1986 Great
Lakes Water Levels reference. Focus, supra note 117, at 14. The LLC. is "committed
to receiving input from a widening range of sources." Sixth Biennial Report on Great
Lakes Water Quality 54, International Joint Commission (1992) [hereinafter Sixth Biennial Report]. Pursuant to this commitment, the I.LC. has: 1) implemented a public
information program; 2) held round table discussions on discharge of toxic substances;
3) integrated non-governmental members onto its boards and committees; 4) required
the boards and committees to hold public meetings; 5) enhanced its public education
programs. Il Further, in any proceeding or inquiry under IJ.C. jurisdiction, the
Boundary Waters Treaty requires that all interested parties be given convenient opportunity to be heard. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. XII. The Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1978 required the I.J.C. to establish the public information service for its programs, including public hearings. 1978 Agreement, supra note
121, art. VIII, para. 3.
130. Woodward, supra note 72, at 333.
131. Woodward, supra note 72, at 333.
132. Woodward, supra note 72, at 335.
133. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 336 (summarizing the provisions of the
1972 Agreement). The 1972 Agreement required the I.J.C. to serve as a clearinghouse
for water quality data collected by the national, state, and provincial governments. kI&
In addition, the Agreement directed the I.J.C. to provide governmental entities with
advice regarding water quality issues, to coordinate research, and to investigate water
quality matters referred by the parties. Id. In order to facilitate this expanded role, the
I.J.C. was to submit annual budgets of anticipated expenses. kId at 337.

134. See Woodward, supra note 72 (recounting how the Canadian and American
governments were unable to fully implement the 1972 Agreement). The governments
encountered the problem of the agreement's failure to grant the IJ.C. any enforcement
powers. Id at 337-39. The 1978 Agreement, however, did not remedy this shortcoming. kId at 338. The 1978 Agreement differed from the 1972 Agreement in that it
was more comprehensive, and required the permanent establishment of the Great
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I.LC. has made significant contributions to rehabilitating the Great
Lakes.'" The problem of persistent toxic substances is the current focus of I.C. efforts in the Great Lakes Basin."
The LLC. also continues its activities with regard to other environmental issues along the United States-Canada border."" Among these
other issues, the Skagit-High Ross controversy offers an unusual example of how the I.LC. can force resolution of a dispute, even in the
absence of legal enforcement powers." The Skagit-High Ross controversy developed when the City of Seattle planned to raise the height of
the High Ross Dam on the Skagit River, near the border between the
State of Washington and the Province of British Columbia."" Although

Lakes Regional Office, the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, and the Great Lakes
Water Quality Board, to assist the LU.C. in carrying out its duties. Id at 337-38.

Additional provisions in the 1978 Agreement deal with the discharge of toxic and
hazardous substances, airborne pollution, and the implementation of a coordinated surveillance and monitoring program in the Great Lakes Basin. Id. The monitoring pro-

gram is expected to "assess compliance with the pollution control requirements and
achievement of the Objectives, to provide information for measuring whole lake response to control measures and to identify emerging problems." 1978 Agreement,
supra note 121, art. VI,
1(m). As in the 1972 Agreement, the IJ.C. was directed
to submit yearly budgets of expenses anticipated as a result of its additional responsibilities. Id. art. VIII, 4. The Agreeement required each party to "seek funds" to pay
one-half of the annual I.C. budget requirements, but neither party is required to pay
more than the other. Id.
135. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 343, 344 (arguing that the LJC.'s primary
contributions have been fact-finding, alerting the governments and public to potential
problems, and coordinating government efforts).
136. See Sixth Biennial Report, supra note 129, at 2 (discussing the complex
problems associated with the Great Lakes Ecosystem).
137. See Focus, supra note 117, at 14 (describing ongoing activities in the St.
Croix River area). See also L.C. AcTmVTI=, supra note 72, at 24-31 (summarizing
IJ.C. activities in other parts of the border area); Jackie Krollop Kim and Marion E.
Marts, The. Skagit-High Ross Controversy: Negotiation and Settlement, 26 NAT. RE-

SOURCES J. 261 (1986) (detailing the LC.'s role in resolving a conflict over raising
the height of a dam near the border between Washington State and British Columbia).
138. See generally Kim and Marts, supra note 137 (providing a detailed account
of how the IJ.C. resolved the controversy).
139. See Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627
F.2d 499, 503-05 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (relating the history of plans for the High Ross
Dam). The original dam and the plans for its ultimate expansion dated back to 1927.
Id. The primary function of the dam was to provide hydroelectric power for the City
of Seattle. Id. The U.C. initially approved raising the height of the dam in 1942,
contingent upon a satisfactory plan to compensate British Columbia for the inundation
of additional land. Id Seattle and British Columbia signed a compensation agreement
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the I.J.C. had approved the dam expansion in 1942, public attitudes towards the environment had changed on both sides of the border by the
time Seattle was ready to go forward with the plan.'4" The I.J.C. reviewed the dam proposal from 1973 to 1977, and British Columbia and
Seattle negotiated throughout the 1970's with little success. "' Although
the I.J.C. eventually upheld its earlier order, British Columbia remained
unwilling to let the project go forward, and appealed a second time.'
In the face of the developing impasse, new Commissioners at the I.JC.
took a forceful approach towards resolving the dispute.'"
First, the I.JC. Commissioners consciously chose to engage in a dispute resolution process, rather than simply to approve or disapprove the
project at issue.'" They next appointed advisors to study Seattle's ener-

in 1967, but British Columbia reneged in 1974, because of public opposition to expanding the reservoir. Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 261-67.
140. See High Ross Dam Agreement Announced, UPI, Mar. 30, 1983, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that strong, environmentally-based opposition to the dam expansion developed in both British Columbia and Washington State).
In 1974, as a result of this opposition, British Columbia asked the I.J.C. to reconsider
its earlier approval of the project. Id. British Columbia expressed concern that the
higher dam would have caused the inundation of nearly 5,000 acres in British Columbia, loss of free-flowing river, and loss of hiking access to scenic mountain areas. Id.
at 265-66. Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 266.
141. See Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 266-67 (explaining why the 1970's
settlement negotiations did not succeed). See also Swinomish Tribal Community, 627
F.2d at 504-505 (summarizing I.J.C. review of the dam proposal during the period
from April 1974 to July 1977). As indicated by the name of this case, a Native
American community was also a major intervener in the case. Id. The tribe argued
that raising the dam height would impair the downstream fishery, in violation of their
treaty with the United States. Id. at 506.
142. See Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 268 (delineating the positions of
British Columbia and Seattle after the negotiations broke down). British Columbia
made its second appeal to the IJ.C. in August of 1980. Regional News, UPI, Apr.
28, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The provincial government
believed that either this appeal would succeed, or the national governments would
intervene and force a settlement in its favor. Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 268.
Seattle took the position that it was legally entitled to expand the dam, by virtue of
I.J.C. and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approvals, as well as its 1967
agreement with British Columbia. Id. Thus, by 1980, both parties had reason to believe they would prevail, and both were unwilling to settle. Id
143. See Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 268-73 (describing how the I.J.C.
changed its approach to resolving the controversy).
144. See Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 269 (asserting that the new Commission found authority for this role in the general dispute resolution intent expressed
in the opening paragraph of the Boundary Waters Treaty). Previously, the I.J.C. had
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gy requirements, compensation issues, and the technical and monetary
alternatives." While its advisors studied the issue, the LJ.C. pointedly
informed both parties that there was no guarantee of prevailing on the
merits, and that they would be expected to reach an agreement."
Next, the L.C. issued a supplemental order,'" and appointed a special
board to oversee and report on the progress of negotiations."' The intense pressure
from the I.LC. eventually forced the parties to arrive at a
a 1 49
settlement.

limited its role to examining the issue within the context of its formal application

procedure. Id
145. See Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 269-70 (discussing how the special
advisors arbitrated the complex technical issues of cost and output of High Ross and
the most likely alternatives for providing power to Seattle).
146. See Kitm and Marts, supra note 137, at 270 (maintaining that the LJ.C. deliberately attempted to make the parties uncertain as to whether their position would
prevail, if the LJ.C. were forced to reach a final decision). The IJ.C. Commissioners
visited both Seattle and British Columbia to deliver their messages, and then had the
parties meet at the LJ.C. Washington, D.C. offices. r& At the meeting, the IJ.C.
Commissioners presented the parties with a supplementary order that would be issued
shortly and informed the parties that the Commission would postpone a final decision.
Id The supplementary order included a declaration that the IJ.C. had no obligation to
arrive at a final resolution, but intended to retain jurisdiction. Id. at 272. The Commissioners then made it clear that the L.C. would not assume responsibility for the
ultimate outcome, and the parties would have to arrive at a settlement. Id. at 270.
147. See Kime and Marts, supra note 137, at 269-73 (explaining the content and
purpose of the supplemental order). See also Regional News, supra note 142 (quoting
Seattle City and British Columbia officials' descriptions of their respective negotiating
positions).
148. Regional News, supra note 142. The special board consisted of two non-governmental experts, two LLC. Commissioners, representatives of the national governments, and representatives of the City of Seattle and the Province of British Columbia. Id The LI.C. required the Board to report on the progress of negotiations every
four months. Id. Specifically, the IJ.C. directed the board to "co-ordinate, facilitate,
and review on a continuing basis activities directed to achieving and implementing a
negotiated, mutually acceptable agreement between the city and the provinc." IdL
149. See Seattle Muni Resolves 15-Year Dispute with Canada Over Hiking Dam
Capacity, ELECT C UTHLrS WEEK, Apr. 25, 1983, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File (detailing the terms of the settlement agreement). The settlement
required agreements between British Columbia and Seattle, and British Columbia and
the Canadian Federal Government, as well as a treaty between the United States and
Canada. Id. British Columbia and Seattle agreed that Seattle would pay British Columbia the amount it would have cost to expand the dam. Id In turn, British Columbia would supply Seattle with the electricity it could have generated from the
dam, over a period of eighty years. At The parties also agreed to create an environmental endowment fund for the area around the existing reservoir. Kims and Marts,
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B. THE I.JC. AS A MODEL

Despite its forceful actions in the Skagit River-High Ross controversy,
the I.J.C. remains an organization of limited powers and limited effectiveness.'" Nevertheless, the I.JC.'s role in the controversy and in the
Great Lakes Basin suggests solutions to several deficiencies in the existing NACE proposals. Further, the I.JC. experience illustrates possible
ways to alleviate some of the concerns that prompted the original NACE
proposal.' In organizational terms, the I.JC. offers a strong structural
model for the NACE. On a functional level, the I.J.C. experience demonstrates how an international commission, with few formal enforcement
powers, can have a highly significant and positive effect on the resolution of environmental problems. In addition, the I.JC.'s experience also
suggests the importance of governmental funding and adequate resources,'2 governmental cooperation,' 53 and public participation.

supra note 173, at 275. The treaty between the United States and Canada enabled the
national governments to serve as guarantors of the agreement between the City of
Seattle and British Columbia, ensuring that each party meets its obligations under the
settlement agreement. Id. at 277. See also Skagit River Pact Signed, Facts on File
World News Digest, Apr. 13, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File
(reporting signature of the agreement by the Canadian Secretary of State for External
Affairs and the United States Secretary of State); International News, UPI, Dec. 14,
1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (recording the exchange of ratification instruments for the international treaty which resolved the controversy); Treaty
with Canada Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake in the State of Washington,
and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend d'Oreille River in the Province of British
Columbia, Apr. 2, 1984, U.S.-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 11088.
150. See Woodward, supra note 72, at 343 (concluding that the I.J.C. has made
important contributions to the improvement of water quality despite its weakness as a
formal power in the area of pollution control).
151. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, and accompanying text (discussing the concerns that led a coalition of environmental groups to propose the creation of the NACE).
152. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. XII (providing that the
United States and Canadian governments shall pay the staff expenses of the IJ.C.
sections in their respective countries, and that joint expenses of the entire I.J.C. must
be paid by both states, in equal proportions). See also 1978 Agreement, supra note
121, art. VIII (requiring the IJ.C. to submit annual budgets of anticipated expenses);
Sixth Biennial Report, supra note 129, at 5-13 (reporting that national, state, and
provincial governments have spent billions of dollars in support of programs developed pursuant to the 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements).
153. See e.g., Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 277 (describing the national
governments' roles as guarantors of the settlement agreement in the Skagit-High Ross

19931

STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL MODELS

929

The NACE outlined in the environmental coalition proposal is similar

in structure to the IJ.C., but slightly less elaborate.'

The I.J.C. is

comprised of three commissioners each from Canada and the United
States,'r while the environmental coalition proposed four NACE commissioners from each NAFTA party.'" The coalition proposal also advocates a NACE that employs a professional staff similar to the staff of
the I.LC.,'L while the United States government outline does not specify any staff at all."' Both existing NACE proposals include elements
approximating the permanent and semi-permanent advisory boards that
assist the I.LC. in its work. ' " The coalition proposal provides for local
citizen committees, and the government proposal provides for the op-

controversy). See also Interview with Frank Bevacqua, supra note 81 (noting that the
IJ.C. could not investigate a matter referred unilaterally by one government, in the
absence of cooperation from the other government).
154. See generally ENVIRONmENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7 (proposing the environmental coalition version of how the NACE should be structured). See also supra
notes 42-55 and accompanying text (summarizing the coalition proposal).
155. LU.C. AcTrvrriEs, supra note 72, at 4. The IJ.C. Commissioners have diverse
backgrounds. See id. at 6-7 (reporting that among the six Commissioners sitting in
1987-88, members had experience in state legislatures, the United States Congress, the
Canadian Parliament, government ministerial posts, United Nations delegations, a
judgeship, private law firms, and engineering work).
156. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2 (proposing four representatives from each party, including some from non-governmental organizations). The
coalition proposal would also require that all NACE commissioners have expertise in
environmental affairs, and no vested interests in trade resulting from the NAFTA. rd.
at 2. Cf. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. XII (requiring IJ.C. Commissioners to make a solemn declaration that they will carry out their duties in an impartial manner). See also IJ.C. ACTIrIvmEs, supra note 72, and accompanying text
(discussing the actual record of IJ.C. impartiality). But see Letter from Carla A.
hIMs, supra note 59 (stating that the NACE Commissioners will be the U.S. EPA
Administrator and his Mexican and Canadian counterparts). If a NACE with the structure proposed by the U.S. government were implemented, it follows that it could
never truly claim impartiality, since its commissioners would be individuals whose
duty it is to carry out the environmental policies of their respective governments.
157. See LJ.C. AcnvITMS, supra note 72, at 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing IJ.C. staff, headquarters, and advisory boards).

158. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting the failure to mention a
NACE staff in the U.S. Government's outline proposal).
159. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (delineating generally the functions
of the advisory boards). See also 1978 Agreement, supra note 121, art. VIII (mandating the establishment, and specifying the functions, of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Board and Great Lakes Science Advisory Board). See also L.C. ACTWrrIs, supra
note 72, at 43-57 (listing and describing the role of each of the advisory boards).
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tional public advisory committees.6 0
In both the coalition and government proposals, the suggested committees represent attempts to provide for some form of public participation in NACE activities. The I.J.C. approach of having permanent,
expert advisory boards, along with frequent public hearings, offers a
practical compromise."' While the .J.C. employs these mechanisms to
facilitate public participation in its deliberations, the Boundary Water
Treaty requires only that parties with interests in a matter before the
I.C. must be heard." The coalition NACE proposal would require
broad dissemination of a draft annual report, subject to public notice and
comment, and refined through a process of taking testimony at public
hearings.'
Any eventual treaty establishing a NACE could require
public participation of the sort the I.J.C. employs voluntarily.
I.J.C. activities also offer models for the NACE. The I.JC. reference
procedure is adaptable to almost any issue,'" and issues related to the
linkage between trade and environmental degradation would be amenable
to resolution by an analogous procedure. The data collection, processing
and dissemination functions of the I.J.C. are, in essence, already incorporated in both existing NACE proposals.'" With regard to this func-

160. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, at 2 (requiring the parties
to foster the development of local citizen committees to advise and aid the NACE in
monitoring and resolving local environmental issues). Cf DRAFr OUTLINE, supra note
16, at 2 (allowing each NAFIA party the option of creating public advisory committees, possibly composed of representatives from citizen groups, environmental organizations, state and local governments, academia, industry, and labor).
161. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (considering the .J.C. commitment to frequent public hearings and broad dissemination of information regarding its
activities).
162. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 70, art. XII (providing that parties
interested in a dispute before the I.LC. must be given convenient opportunity to be
heard). See also Sixth Biennial Report, supra note 129, at 54 (reiterating the I.J.C.
commitment to broad public contribution, but acknowledging criticism that I.J.C. procedures have not always been sufficiently open).
163. See ENviRo mN-AL
m
SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, art. 2 (describing the contents of the NACE annual report and providing suggestions on how the report should
be drafted and modified).
164. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (summarizing the IJ.C. reference procedure).
165. See ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, arts. 1-2 (proposing an
annual reporting process involving extensive data collection and broad dissemination of
information). See also DRAFt OUTL.INE, supra note 16 (incorporating environmental
problem identification, technology sharing, and information collection and dissemination
functions for the proposed NACE).
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tion, a NACE mechanism similar to the IJ.C. advisory boards might
also be useful as a coordinating and investigating body. Both existing
NACE proposals are deficient in giving the NACE an adjudicatory role
in NAFTA related environmental disputes."s The LJ.C. model is also
of limited use in this context, since in practice, the IJ.C. has no adjudicatory functions." In contrast, the EC Article 169 procedure offers a
viable model for an international commission adjudicating a limited type
of complaint."
C. THE ARTICLE 169 PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE

The Article 169 procedure is limited to the extent that the EC Commission will only investigate a complaint alleging that an EC member
state is infringing, or failing to implement, EC law." The procedure
suffers from other limitations as well."" The EC Commission possesses
relatively few resources to investigate environmental matters and therefore must rely on member state governments and the public for much of

166. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (delineating the limited form of
complaint resolution embodied in the environmental coalition NACE proposal). Under
the coalition proposal, the NACE would be able to hear and investigate complaints,
but if a party in violation of environmental requirements chose not to act on NACE
recommendations, the only remedy proposed is publication in the NACE annual report. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS, supra note 7, art. 3, 4.
167. But see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (explaining the IJ.C. application procedure). The application procedure is essentially a permitting process, and as
such, it may be likened to an administrative tlemaking. The arbitration provision in
the Boundary Waters Treaty could be called an adjudicatory process, but the two
governments have never referred a matter to the U.C. for arbitration. See supra note
86 and accompanying text (noting that the IJ.C. has never arbitrated a dispute). Cf
supra notes 138-149 (summarizing the IJ.C. role in the Skagit-High Ross controversy). Although the IJC. does not have formal arbitration powers in the absence of a
binational reference, IJ.C. action in the Skagit-H-igh Ross certainly resembled arbitration or mediation. Kim and Marts, supra note 137, at 272.
168. See supra notes 105-116 and accompanying text (outlining the workings and
subject matter of the Article 169 procedure).
169. STANLEY P. JOHNSON AND GUY CORCLLE, THE ENVIRONiENTAL PoUcy OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITEs 341 (1989). Although the type of complaint is limited,
EC law takes precedence over member state national laws in many fields of environmental law. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing the areas of law where
the EC is competent). Thus, the Article 169 procedure is a single type of complaint
that is used to address problems in many legal fields. See EC Commission, supra
note 108 (categorizing the Article 169 proceedings during the 1980's by area of EC
law addressed).
170. Macrory, supra note 105, at 362-369.
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its information."" The number and types of environmental complaints
filed vary greatly between the member states, arguably a consequence of
differing political and environmental traditions among their inhabitants." This could result in the uneven use of the Article 169 procedure, although there is evidence that the EC Commission is aware of the
problem and attempts to compensate for it.' Ultimately though, EC
environmental law is only enforceable to the extent that the member
states and their inhabitants are willing to enforce it.""
D. THE ARTICLE 169 PROCEDURE AS A MODEL
Despite, or even because of, its limitations, the Article 169 procedure
could be adapted to fit the North American context. The NAFTA parties
do not intend to cede any sovereign rights, at least not with regard to
environmental matters." s NAFTA does create a trade commission to
resolve disputes arising under the Agreement, but like the I.J.C., the
trade commission cannot act unless one of the parties requests it to do
so.' 76 The NAFTA parties have agreed to the parallel establishment of
a North American Commission on the Environment, but as it is currently envisioned by the United States government, the Commission is purely an advisory body." The Article 169 procedure represents a partial
cession of sovereignty from the EC member states to the EC Commission. In contrast, the NAFTA parties have agreed that the NACE will
78
not be allowed to impinge seriously on their national sovereignty.

171. Macrory, supra note 105, at 362-369. When the EC Commission itself initiates an Article 169 procedure, it is most often the result of the failure of member
states to provide the EC Commission with the texts of legislation implementing EC
directives. Id. at 353. See also Interview with Frank Bevacqua, supra note 81 (suggesting that the IJ.C. would also have difficulty pursuing its investigations without
the active cooperation of the Canadian and United States governments).
172. Macrory, supra note 105, at 364.
173. Macrory, supra note 105, at 364.
174. Macrory, supra note 105, at 368-69.
175. See Press Release, supra note 9, at I (stating that any environmental cooperation among the NAFIA parties must not encroach upon their sovereignty).
176. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2004. Further, the NAFrA draft limits the type
of environmental dispute referable to the NAFTA Trade Commission. See supra note
34 and accompanying text (explaining that where one NAFTA party asserts that an
environmental standard of another party is a disguised barrier to trade, the disputo
may ultimately be referred to the NAFTA Trade Commission for resolution).
177. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing the characteristics
and weaknesses of the United States government's NACE proposal).
178. See Press Release, supra note 9 (declaring that environmental cooperation
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Given this limitation and the lack of a North American equivalent to the
European Court of Justice, how can the NACE adapt the Article 169
procedure?
The answer lies in NAFrA itself. In addition to the form of environmental dispute already subject to explicit provisions in NAFTA,'
two types of environmental claims arise implicitly from the more general environmental language of the Agreement. One is a claim based on
the Preamble resolutions to foster free trade "in a manner consistent
with environmental protection and conservation."" The second implicit
claim arises under NAFTA Article 1114, establishing a non-binding obligation to avoid the creation of pollution havens."'
These provisions of NAFTA, as currently drafted, do not impose any
binding legal obligations upon the NAFTA parties. " The eventual
agreement creating the NACE could explicitly transmute these non-binding commitments into binding legal duties. The parties could then give
the NACE jurisdiction over the two newly created types of environmental legal claims: 1) that a NAFTA party is pursuing development in a
manner which is environmentally unsustainable; and 2) that a NAFTA
party or political subdivision is waiving, derogating from, or otherwise
failing to enforce its own environmental laws, for the purpose of encouraging investment.
The EC Article 169 procedure provides an excellent model of how
the NACE could adjudicate these claims.' Private parties, governmental entities, and non-governmental organizations would file a complaint
with the NACE. The NACE would investigate the matter and, if warranted, send a formal notice of infringement to the alleged violating
party. If that party did not resolve the problem within a specified time
period, the NACE would issue a" reasoned opinion delineating the extent

among the NAFrA parties must be within a context of respect for national sovereign-

ty).

179. See supra note 34 (describing the type of environmental claim the NAFTA
Trade Commission will be permitted to adjudicate).
180. NAFTA, supra note 2, Preamble.
181. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (describing the non-binding
character of the existing language).
182. See NAFTA, supra note 2, Preamble (resolving to promote sustainable investment and to undertake other NAFTA obligations in ways that am consistent with

environmental protection). See id. at art. 1114 (stating that the parties should not
encourage investment by lowering environmental standards).
183. See supra notes 105-116 and accompanying text (outlining the workings of
the EC Article 169 procedure).
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of the problem, and would specify acceptable remedies. Finally, if no
action by the violating party is forthcoming, the NACE should have
authority to pursue the case in court. The NACE parties could neatly
sidestep the sovereignty problem by giving the NACE standing to litigate these two types of claims in the national courts of the violating
party. This solution would minimize the NACE's infringement on national sovereignty, because it would require national courts to resolve
the claims on the basis of national laws.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The proposed North American Commission on the Environment
should structurally resemble the I.J.C. It should have an equal number
of commissioners from each NACE member. The commissioners should
be independent of their national governments, subject to a requirement
of impartiality, and have a high level of credibility and expertise regarding environmental matters. The NACE should have offices in the national capitals, and in the border regions, with permanent staffs in each
office. The NACE would receive funding from annual budgetary allocations from the national governments, or possibly, from dedicated taxes
on the additional trade resulting from NAFTA. '
In addition to the permanent staff, the NACE could have one or more
advisory boards, with members from diverse backgrounds. In particular,
the advisory boards must include members from environmental organizations, as well as representatives of the regions whose environments are
most affected by increased trade. The organic treaty creating the NACE
should require that it maximize public participation in all aspects of its
work.
On a functional level, the existing NACE proposals are more or less
adequate with regard to data collection and dissemination functions. The
I.J.C. reference procedure should be adapted to enable the NACE to
study linkages between trade and environmental degradation, at the
request of one or more NACE member states. Just as Canada and the
United States can now voluntarily refer certain types of disputes to the
I.I.C., the NACE agreement should include a provision that allows the
three NAFTA parties to refer transboundary environmental disputes to

184. See e.g., Ward and Prickett, supra note 39, at 44 (proposing that an existing
United States value added duty on products assembled in Mexico be dedicated to
environmental uses). More generally, the article suggests that "green" taxes would
allow some of the economic benefits of increased trade to be dedicated for environmental purposes. IL
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the NACE for investigation and recommended solutions.
Finally, the NACE should have at least some authority to oversee and
enforce the environmental provisions of NAFTA. NAFTA contemplates
one type of international environmental dispute in which one NAFrA
party asserts that an environmental regulation or standard of another
party constitutes a disguised barrier to trade.'" In this type of dispute,
absent an early settlement, ultimate resolution would be under the auspices of the NAFTA Trade Commission." One obvious role for the
NACE is as a participant and advisor in this type of environmental
dispute. Specifically, NAFTA should incorporate a provision requiring
the concurrence of the NACE before an environmental standard or regulation could be declared a disguised trade barrier by an arbitral panel of
the NAFTA Trade Commission.
The Article 169 procedure of the EC Commission suggests that the
NACE could have a second type of adjudicatory function. The NACE
treaty could create two causes of action. Under these causes of action,
an individual or organization would allege that a NAFTA party is promoting development in a generally unsustainable manner, or by failing
to enforce or derogating from its environmental laws. The NACE would
investigate the complaint to determine whether it is valid, and would
issue a reasoned opinion. The NACE would also have standing to pursue the matter in national courts if no remedial action were taken.
CONCLUSION
The current NAFTA draft includes some positive environmental language, but creates no binding environmental duties for the NAFTA
parties. Responding to criticism from environmental organizations, the
United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed, in principle, to create a
North American Commission on the Environment. As currently envisioned in separate proposals from the United States Government and a
coalition of environmental organizations, the NACE would be primarily
an advisory body.
Based 6n the existing models of the International Joint Commission
and the European Community Article 169 procedure, this comment
proposes alterations to the existing conceptions of a NACE. These alter185. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (summarizing the only existing
NAFTA provisions for the resolution of international environmental disputes).
186. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining how a dispute on environmental standards could be resolved under the jurisdiction of the NAFTA Trade
Commission).

936

AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'Y

[VOL. 8:913

ations would enhance the advisory role of the NACE and give the
NACE greater ability to resolve international environmental disputes. It
would also have authority to adjudicate and litigate two newly created
types of environmental claims. The NACE outlined in this comment
would be an effective, respected, and non-partisan guardian of environmental norms throughout the North American free trade area.

